Thomas Ferguson: Interpersonality and Inference

Organized by the Department of Logic

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Invitation pdf

Thomas Ferguson (Institute of Philosophy, CAS, Department of Logic):
Interpersonality and Inference

Abstract
In a number of recent talks, I have advocated for a liberalization of the criteria by which we judge a linguistic feature to be "authentically semantic."  The results of several of my recent papers, as I have interpreted them, suggest that linguistic features as diverse as taboo, offense, and care can play a role in determining the shape of theories of inference and meaning. Much of this has been filtered through the lens of Dummett's inferentialist program of meaning-as-use through which logical vocabulary receive meanings through grounds for assertion. Intriguingly, Dummett's inferentialism presupposes a marked distinction between grounds for assertion (on the one hand) and consequences of assertion (on the other). It seems obvious, however, that such grounds and consequences are inextricably tangled up together in many ways, suggesting a critical role to be played by interpersonal properties in determining theories of inference and meaning. In this talk, we will discuss some of the consequences of opening this nexus between interpersonality and inference including, for example, an opportunity for distinct ethical theories (such as deontological or utilitarian positions) to influence accounts of validity. Most interestingly, this allows a generalization from Putnam's "semantic externalism" (according to which the meaning of nonlogical vocabulary is conferred by external or social features) to a "logical externalism" (according to which the meaning of logical vocabulary is similarly determined). (This is joint work with Jitka Kadlečíková.)