The philosophical production of the Second Scholasticism of the XVIth and XVIIth centuries presents a remarkable interest in the subject of human knowledge, shown by the great number of works related to this theme. Among them, very interesting is the Aristotelis Logica Magna (Salamanca, 1600), written by the Dominican Juan Sánchez Sedeño. Through a balanced use of sources and new hypotheses He constructs an original logical theory of knowledge, using the concepts of intentionalitas, prima intentio and secunda intentio, with which he tries to understand how man knows the world. In this sense, one of the most problematic aspects is that of the intentio thought as passio entis, with which Sánchez Sedeño wonders if the logical intentionality is a passio intellectus of the man who knows the world or, instead, if it is a property of res, which allows it to be known.
In my paper, I will show how Sánchez Sedeño's theory moves towards the consideration of the intentio sive passio intellectus, whereby man is not merely a passive receptor of res, but is an active and fundamental part of the process of knowledge. In this way, the intentio is the starting point from which Sedeño begins to study how man is placed in the world, both as a creature and as a person who knows reality and from it interprets his destiny.