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invitation pdf participants pdf
Mary Devereaux (University of California, San Diego)
Jérôme Dokic (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris)
Pascal Engel (EHESS-CRAL, Paris)
James Grant (University of Oxford)
Maria Jose Alcaraz Leon (University of Murcia)
Carola Barbero (University of Turin)
Joerg Fingerhut (Humboldt University of Berlin)
Niklas Forsberg (University of Pardubice)
Tereza Hadravová (Charles University, Prague)
Tomáš Hříbek (Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague)
Petr Koťátko (Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague)
Šárka Lojdová (Charles University, Prague)
Sabrina Muchová (Charles University, Prague)
Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp)
Anders Pettersson (Umea University)
Marion Renauld (Université de Lorraine)
Göran Rossholm (University of Stockholm)
Magda Stanová (Artist, Czech Republic)
Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping University)
Enrico Terrone (University of Barcelona – Logos)
"The aesthetic attitude is a myth and while, as G. Ryle has said, myths often do a lot of theoretical good while they are still new, this particular one is no longer useful and in fact misleads aesthetic theory."
(George Dickie, The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude)
George Dickie’s judgement regarding aesthetic attitude haunts the philosophical aesthetics for more than a half century. Dickie argues that aesthetic attitude simply does not exist if we take it as a specific state of mind and it may be conceived as a mere attention to object (be it a poem, a painting, or a landscape). Recently, a number of authors have returned to Dickie’s criticism and took it as an occasion to rethink the very nature of aesthetic attitude and aesthetic experience which is based on it. The colloquium will focus on the main questions raised in these debates and other closely related issues, such as:
What is aesthetic experience? A specific attitude, perceptual engagement, metacognitive feeling or something else?
How does aesthetic experience relate to categories such as pleasure or disinterestedness? Are they essential features of aesthetic experience?
What is the relationship between aesthetic experience and evaluation? Is aesthetic experience conceivable without appreciation of the object?
How does aesthetic experience relate to emotions and affects? May we consider “emotionless” aesthetic experience?
How do we express aesthetic experiences? Are there specifically “aesthetic” linguistic terms (nouns, adjectives) or is the domain of aesthetic expressions rather open?
How do aesthetic judgements refer to reality? Are there any specific mechanisms of “aesthetic” reference?
How does a disagreement between aesthetic judgements take place? May we consider conditions of correctness of aesthetic judgements?
What is the relationship between aesthetic experience and cognition? Is aesthetic experience conceivable in terms of cognitive act?
How does aesthetic experience relate to ethics? Do aesthetic and ethical values in the work of art overlap or are they mutually independent?
Are beauty and sublime still conceivable as the main types of aesthetic properties? What other types are there?
What is the relationship between art and aesthetic experience? Is a work of art conceivable independently of aesthetic experience or is aesthetic experience the very condition of arthood?
How does aesthetic experience relate to kitsch? Does kitsch also offer an aesthetic experience or does it stand outside the aesthetic domain?
Does aesthetic experience differ across various arts? How do plastic art, literature, music, theatre, film, conceptual art or videogames elicit an aesthetic experience?
The main co-ordinators of the conference:
Tomas Koblizek (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Petr Koťátko (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)