Mirja Hartimo (Helsinki): Husserl and Frege and the analytic turn
Abstract In Dummett’s oft-repeated metaphor, Frege and Husserl are like the Danube and the Rhine, "which rise quite close to one another and for a time pursue roughly parallel courses, only to diverge in utterly different directions and flow into different seas" (Dummett 1993, 26). In this paper, their common origin is traced to Hermann Rudolf Lotze’s view of logic and their initial "parallel courses" to their respective reactions against psychologism about logic. Whereas Dummett claims they diverge in their view of sense, which is linguistic for Frege and not so for Husserl, this paper locates the turning point in their respective views of what an antipsychological logic should be like. Whereas Frege held a so-called logic-first view and gave his Begriffsschrift as an answer, Husserl extends logic to mathematics and suggests a critical conception that raises questions about the presuppositions required by logic and admits a possibility of there being several logics. This then, namely the different views on logic, is viewed as a watershed dividing some approaches within 20th century philosophy: it yields different kinds of views about the nature of logical analysis, contrary views of whether reason is tantamount to logic, and possibly also diverging metaontological approaches. The talk will end by reflections about what this watershed could be said to divide.