50 years ago, Dieter Henrich wrote an influential little text on ‘Fichte’s Original Insight’. Seldom has so much food for thought been put in a nutshell. The essay, bearing such an unremarkable title, delivers a diagnosis of why three hundred years of penetrating thought about the internal structure of subjectivity have ended up so fruitless. Henrich’s point was: Self-consciousness cannot be explained as the result of a higher-order act bending back upon a first-order one, given that “what reflection finds, must already have been there before“ (Novalis). Whereas Henrich’s discovery had some influence in German speaking countries (and was dubbed the ‘Heidelberg School’), it remained nearly unnoticed in the anglophone (and now dominant) philosophical world. This is starting to change now that a recent view on (self-)conscious-ness, called ‘self-representationalism’, is beginning to develop and to discover its Heidelberg roots.