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Abstracts

Espen Aarseth (IT University of Copenhagen)
THE VIRTUAL IS REAL: THE LIMITS OF "FICTI-" IN LUDIC CONTEXTS

Fiction is a category traditionally associated with literature and verbal representation; as a layman's term it simply means made-up stories about events that did not happen. In theory, it becomes somewhat more complicated; distinctions are made between fiction, fictionality, fictive, fictitious and fictionalization. However, the theories of fiction, whether rhetorical, semantic or pragmatic, are not well suited to game worlds and ludic phenomena, but nevertheless they are used, because this fits well with the popular conception of 'videogames' as a genre of fiction. But the fact that (video-)games resemble fiction on a representational level, as well as on a referential level (the phenomena are typically depicted and not physically real; its signifiers look like animations from film) does not make them fictional, any more than a documentary animated film would be.

The paper will instead argue for an empirical approach: Fiction, regardless of theoretical flavor, always has a non-existing reference or signified. Games typically do not (the exception is make-believe games); their signifiers refer to an objective game-state, upheld independently of the player's mind. To approach this situation with the tools of fiction theory is therefore a mistake; one that would not be committed in other domains, say historiography. Instead of tediously going through fiction theories one by one to determine whether specific definitions of fiction apply to game phenomena or not, it should be sufficient to demonstrate that game phenomena are mentally represented in the same way as other real phenomena

Carola Barbero (University of Torino)
FILLING THE GAPS? UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING INCOMPLETE WORLDS

Literary worlds (together with the objects they contain) – as Roman Ingarden underlines in The literary work of Art (1931/1973) –, differently from the real one, are characterized by spots of indeterminacy, i.e. are not determined under every aspect, hence are nothing but schemas, full of gaps (independently of any additional epistemological incompleteness which may derive from inaccurate readings) that frequently require to be concretized by our acts of reading, i.e. although literary objects are incomplete, they are quite often not grasped as such.

The gaps characterizing these works are "a necessary and universal feature of fictional worlds" (Doležel 1998: 169) and even if it may happen that the reader concretizes what he reads, none of these concretizations coincide with the identity of the work, which remains essentially incomplete. As Thomas Pavel explicitly asks in Fictional Worlds (1986: 107), "how can we decide whether 'Vautrin has a cousin' and 'Lady Macbeth has four children' are true or false in their respective fictional worlds?". There's no way, let's come to term with that and just accept spots of indeterminacy in relation to the relevant narrative. Nonetheless we could be interested in knowing why these details are left unspecified. Maybe because they can be overlooked (without being

damaged our understanding of the work), or because they leave room for the reader's imagination and interpretation (as when we start visualizing the meaning of Flaubert's "elle s'abandonna" referred to Madame Bovary's first love encounter with Rodolphe) or because the gappy structure needs to be perceived as such (as happens with Beckett's En attendant Godot).

While defending the distinction between the literary work and its concretizations, we do not deny the possibility of a genuine access to the work in itself, but rather we mean to preserve the peculiar ontological structure of the literary world (Smith 1979). Under a certain point of view, manifestations of incompleteness are to be seen as a matter of textual choice: literary texts may either accentuate an incomplete quality of the world they construct or they can overcome, minimize and suppress it (actually incompleteness "may result from the rules of the genre or from the whim of the narrator" Pavel 1986: 107).

Josep E. Corbí (University of Valencia)
FICTIONAL WORLDS, NARRATIVITY AND EXPRESSION

In this paper, I am basically concerned with the question as to what makes a fictional world a world at all. For this purpose, I will dwell on Greg Currie's analysis of narratives in *Narratives and Narrators* (OUP, 2010). From a rather Kantian perspective, I should assume that for there to be a world some sort of necessity must be involved. Currie (2010) provides some clues as to how this necessity may be expressed and apprehended in narratives, that is, in stories that are told in ways that ranks high in narrativity, as *TheAmbassadors* by Henry James exemplary does. Narratives typically express a number of points of view but they must necessarily express the point of view (i.e., the framework) from which the author invite us to approach the story. Following up on Currie, a point of view is to be conceived of not so much as a phenomenological experience but 'as a way of responding to the world'. One might then assume that the fictional world a narrative creates is the world the disparate points of views respond to. A crucial question arises concerning the attributes of this world: can they be individuated independently of the distinct points of view involved, namely, those of the author, the characters or even the readers or viewers themselves? I will seek to articulate an answer to this question by exploring a number of related issues: Under what conditions can we say that a certain response express a point of view? How do agents relate to those responses to the world that contribute to constituting their respective points of view? Do agents typically decide how to respond or is their specific response typically imposed upon them? Do such responses impose themselves the way a drive or an obsession does or should we allow for some sort of normative constraint? How do normative constraints relate to character as the psychological profile of a particular individual? Are these normative constraints affected by skeptical arguments against character?

Gregory Currie (University of York)
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS: BRIDGES FROM FICTIONAL WORLDS TO THE REAL WORLD?

Fictions present to us scenarios we understand not to be true; their worlds, we say, are not the real world. But one reason for valuing fictions is the light they throw on the way the real world works and how we can alter it. One familiar practice for learning about the real world is the construction of thought experiments, notably in physics and in philosophy. These are small scale fictions designed to tell us something--often something surprising--about the real world, though the scenarios they present may never occur. Can we see the large scale fictions of literature (as well as drama and film) as providing something comparable? Many have said so. Mitchell Green says "If a thought experiment in mathematics or physics can be a source of knowledge, it is far from clear

why a work of literary fiction cannot employ a thought experiment for epistemic purposes." I offer five arguments that suggest scepticism about this view. I don't argue that fictions of the literary, dramatic and filmic kind are not thought experiments; rather that, if they are thought experiments, they lack features important for epistemic reliability.

Niklas Forsberg (University of Pardubice)
BEING TAUGHT HOW TO "READ" BY A WORK OF ART.
THE WORLD OF AN ARTWORK AND THE WORLD OF OURS

A work of art – say, a novel, a film, a painting – is an autonomous whole. There is a sense in which this is true even if one does not view that claim as the endorsement of some robust ontological or epistemological theory about the nature of art. A novel and a film (usually) has a beginning and an end, and a painting is (usually) framed. Thus, they all are, in a certain not negligible sense, *limited wholes*. As such, one may say that a novel or a movie makes up a world of its own.

This fact, however, may seem to make it hard to spell out how the world of a novel, or a film, and perhaps even a painting, latches on to our world. Thus, one may be prone to ask questions about how a fictional world connects to ours. More particular, how we are supposed to learn anything of importance about our world by attending to a fictional one.

This is a point at which it is easy to reach for theory. The kind of theory a lot of philosophers feel the need for, is one that bridges the gap between the artwork and the real world. If we explain how *any* fictional world "can be about" our world, the problem is solved (affirmatively or negatively). Literary scholars often resort to theories about the nature, or state, of the world, or of some central feature of it like, say, "language" or "power," and then use readings of literature as support for (and in some cases as arguments against) these theories. One may also use theories as a sifting device that guides the reading of the novel, leaving only the larger stones that are of real value for the understanding of the real world.

The question I want to raise in this talk is whether this call for theory is well motivated, and if it is the only way forward? Do we really need to find ways to overcome this duality? Perhaps it is possible that artworks can tell us something about us and our world *in virtue of* being autonomous wholes (rather than in spite of them being so?) The handrail to my way of answering these questions will be Stanley Cavell's claim that "the way to overcome theory correctly, philosophically, is to let the object or the work of your interest teach you how to consider it" (Cavell, *Pursuits of Happiness*, p. 10). The central claim I want to argue for, is that it is only by attending to the world of the artwork that we can discern what *it* really says (rather than what, e.g. "a theory" finds in it); and without knowing what it says, we do not have much to go on as we try to learn from it.

Bohumil Fořt (Czech Academy of Sciences)
NARRATIVES, THEIR GAPS AND WORLDS

In recent decades, a group of theorists of narrative have been calling for a narrative theory which would provide them with a set of convincing tools and strategies needed for a firm theoretical grasp of specific fictional narratives. That is, narratives that differ from the prototypical ones commonly used by narrative theory in order to developed its systematic and general models. In order to introduce a more systematic view of a theoretical examination and systemization of specific narrative forms, I will focus on the ways in which narratives lack or lose their consistency, congruency and continuity, become fragmented, disintegrate and, as a result, may collapse. This view is connected with fictional worlds theory and one of its most interesting notions, the notion of gaps. I believe that the notion of gaps, a part of the ontological equipment of fictional worlds that has been elaborated on in depth by Lubomír Doležel, will prove itself a useful tool for grasping

both prototypical as well as non-prototypical narratives in a systematic, and not purely descriptive way. The results of this belief will be presented towards the end of the talk.

Paweł Grabarczyk (IT University of Copenhagen)
ON VIRTUALITY AND FICTION

In a recently published paper David Chalmers (2017) claims that virtual objects should be classified as "real". In some cases, objects can be even fully virtualized, which means that virtualization does not affect the category they belong to. For example, virtual calculators are still calculators. The question as to which objects can or cannot be successfully virtualized remains open. One exception which Chalmers points out refers to video games containing narrative. When you play a video game in which you kill a virtual Hitler or a game in which you traverse virtual Middle Earth, you do not relate to real objects, but rather to fictional ones. This suggests that in the case of video games, virtual objects function rather as Waltonian fictions than real objects. Similar suggestions have been made in (Meskin & Robson 2012) and in (Tavinor 2009)

I argue that this line of reasoning is faulty and that it bases on an infelicitous examples. I build my argumentation on the suggestion found in Brey (2014) who argues that virtualization is possible in cases when it is possible to describe objects in purely functional terms. I argue, that the difficulty with virtualization of objects mentioned in Chalmers' example stems rather from their ontological category (they are individual objects), than from the fact that they are parts of a narration. The conclusion of this argumentation is that the ontological status of virtual objects does not depend on the context they are used in, but rather on the ontological category of their material counterparts.

Brey, P. 2014. The physical and social reality of virtual worlds. In (M. Grimshaw, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality.
Chalmers, D.J, (2017), Disputatio 9 (46):309-352
Meskin, A. & Robson, J. 2012. Fiction and fictional worlds in videogames. In (J. Sageng, ed) The Philosophy of Computer Games. Springer.
Tavinor, J. 2009. The Art of Videogames. Blackwell

Enrico Grosso (University of Torino)
CONNIVING AND NON-CONNIVING USES OF FICTIONAL NAMES: THE MENTAL FILES THEORY

My suggestion is to analyze, at the cognitive level, the difference between conniving and non-conniving uses of sentences containing names of fictional characters in terms of the difference between the kind of mental files that are concerned. Conniving uses do not involve any genuine fact of the world, since we talk about literary characters from inside the pretence: by participating in a game of make-believe, we are invited to imagine a certain situation, for instance that there is a flesh-and-blood woman called "Emma Bovary". In this context, we create a meta-representational file, that is indexed to the story and does not presuppose the existence of a real individual: in the file we store information associated to the world of the story, as participants of that game. On the contrary, with non-conniving uses, we are talking about fictional characters as abstract objects, without any engagement in games of make-believe. Thus, we use a regular file, in which we store meta-fictional information about Emma Bovary, seen as figment of an author's imagination, such as "being a fictional character", "being invented by Gustave Flaubert", and so on. The regular file is based on, or simulates, a relation to an abstract entity, which is no more the flesh-and-blood Emma Bovary of the novel. We can say that the regular and the indexed files are linked together,

but their content is not merged: we keep separate fictional and meta-fictional information about a literary character and we can exploit both files, depending on the situation.

Radomír D. Kokeš (Masaryk University, Brno)
FICTIONAL WORLDS OF SPIRAL NARRATIVE

The paper aims to explain several features of fictional worlds of so-called spiral narrative in audiovisual cinematic storytelling. As the spiral narrative will be identified a specific pattern of audiovisual storytelling with a character stuck in an iterative segment of space, time and causality. They are not only fully aware of their situation, but also try to deal with it. Even though this narrative pattern is known mostly from film GROUNDHOG DAY (1993), there are many other feature films, television films, television episodes or television series. A probable explanation is that these applications of the schema are a result of filmmakers' ambitions to innovate some broadly established models of narrative development from a new perspective. However, this presentation is going to answer somewhat different questions: What kinds of fictional worlds could be designed by the limitations of the schema application? What does the schema application mean for their time, space, causality – or even for their very setting? What roles might the spiral effect play and what functions might the spiral effect fulfil within these worlds and for their inhabitants? Although the presentation will follow a number of "spiral narrative audiovisual works", as the primary analytical case will be the probably best known and already mentioned movie, GROUNDHOG DAY.

Petr Koťátko (Czech Academy of Sciences)
DO WE NEED MORE THAN ONE WORLD?

My paper will start with the question:

/Q/ Which conditions must be met, and in particular, what does the reader have to do (to assume, to accept, to imagine) in order to allow the text of narrative fiction to fulfill its literary functions?

I believe that this question provides proper framework for considerations concerning issues like the status of the world in which the narrated story takes place and of its inhabitants, their identity conditions, their completness or incompletness, the role of fictional names etc. Within this framework, we have a good chance that our considerations will not collapse to solving problems generated by our theories or by their conceptual apparatus, to postulating entities required in order to fill in gaps in these theories or in order to keep the apparatus running.

I will suggest a general reply to /Q/ and then propose a corresponding account of the referential role of fictional names. I will argue that it provides a good basis for specifying the identity conditions of e.g. Emma Bovary, assumed (in the *as if* mode) as a person referred to in Flaubert's text. They should be strictly distinguished from the identity conditions of Emma Bovary as a literary character. If nothing changes by April 10, these considerations will not open any space for postulating literary characters as abstract entities *sui generis* (over and above their being parameters of the literary construction of works of narrative fiction).

Within this framework, there is also no reason for approaching either the assumed referents of fictional names (and the world they inhabit) or literary characters as *incomplete*.

The proposed reply to /Q/ and considerations based on it will presuppose a principle I will call *Reality Commitment*:

/RC/ The storyworld is the real world, typically modified according to the requirements imposed on us by the text (plus relevant interpretive considerations). In other words, it is the state of the real world we are supposed to imagine as actual.

The only philosopher of fiction I am aware of who explicitly subscribes to the position presented in /RC/ is Stacie Friend (cf. *The Real Foundation of the Fictional World*. Australaisian Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1149736, 2016).
At the same time, she defends a general principle of interpretation of a text of narrative fiction, which she calls *Reality Assumption*:

/RA/ Everything that is true or obtains in the real world is storified – that is, we are invited to imagine it as part of the storyworld – unless it is excluded by the work (ibid.).

I will suggest that she should not do so, because /RA/ is compatible with a creationist account of the storyworld which she is committed to reject: that's why /RA/, unlike /RC/, should not be admitted as a proper articulation of „a bias in favour of reality", as Friend presents it. Moreover, I will argue that /RC/ is a better candidate for „a robust starting point for interpretation", as Friend calls it, because it is applicable even in cases when /RA/ is inefficient.

In the end I will discuss an alleged counter-example which is supposed to show that also the applicability of /RC/, as a principle of interpretation of texts of narrative fiction, has its limits.

Thomas Pavel (University of Chicago)
FICTION AND MORAL REFLECTION

Literature in general and narrative genres in particular imagine fictional worlds as sites of human situations, feelings and actions. These worlds present the reader with a variety of moral attitudes which define the atmosphere of each world, the human interactions it favors, and the plots and characters it accommodates. Fictional worlds therefore have quite distinct moral profiles that are tacitly perceived and remembered by readers. The paper will describe five kinds of fictional moral profiles, each corresponding to actual ways of understanding and governing moral action and thought.
In many literary works the dominant moral issue is *duty*, often specified by clear *rules* that characters follow or fail to respect. Numerous ancient myths and plots start with a transgression against the rule of hospitality: e.g. Paris, guest of Menelaus, seduces his wife, Helena; Laius, guest of Pelops, abducts and rapes his son Chrysippus. Sometimes *values inspire* rather than *command* the actions or fictional characters, as do nobility and self-denial in many chivalric novels. *Virtues* understood in the Aristotelian ways as good features of characters are equally crucial in some fictional worlds, e.g. courage, chastity, fidelity in Renaissance and Early Modern tragedy. *Attention* and *compassion* towards those close to us are the mark of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels, from Richardson to Dickens. Finally, *incumbency,* a less clear but irresistible impulse to do what *falls to us* to do, provides the moral meaning of novels by Victor Hugo and Henry James.
The paper will conclude that the moral profile is a crucial aspect of a fictional world.

Anders Pettersson (University of Umea)
INSTEAD OF FICTIONAL WORLDS: A MIND-AND-MATTER APPROACH TO LITERARY REPRESENTATION

For reasons that will be explained briefly in my presentation, I view references to texts merely as a way of speaking. Talk of texts is handy in everyday contexts but distortive when theoretical precision is a priority. The idea of fictional worlds obviously depends on the idea that there are fictional texts whose worlds they are. In my opinion, we should not seriously believe that there are fictional worlds, nor seriously discuss what such worlds may contain and why.

In my talk I will introduce a different model for the understanding of verbal communication than the text model; I call it the mind-and-matter model. This model only reckons with mental and physical entities where communication is concerned. To use Jane Austen's *Emma* as an example: according to the mind-and-matter model there is no *Emma* as such. There are material entities: the physical copies of (copies of …) Austen's manuscript. There are also mental entities: the various meaning-ideas of Austen and her readers relating to such copies.

If we think along these lines, there is not really any specific object that is *Emma* and is associated with a specific fictional world. However, there are, or were, various ideas about Emma Woodhouse and everything around her in the minds of Austen and her readers. We cannot ask what the fictional world of *Emma* contains, but we can ask the empirical question what readers imagine about Emma Woodhouse and everything around her, and we can ask the normative question what they should imagine.

Marion Renauld (Universite de Lorraine)
WHY FICTIONAL WORLDS ?

It seems that the concept of "fictional world" has been adopted both by philosophers and literary theorists, mainly in order to explain what is true in a work of fiction, and more precisely to deal with the problem of reference without existence. In my talk, I will claim that we don't need such a concept for such an inquiry, that it is even confusing and misleading. I will first ask why these fictional worlds are exactly called for and what they really are – being mostly presented as something like a special case of possible worlds. I will then show that we can and actually should do without them, following analyses by Peter Lamarque, Nelson Goodman and Roger Caillois: not only is it a debatable methodology, but also a partial way of looking at what is at stake with a (work of) fiction. I will finally try to explain why we nevertheless are so often inclined to reify the products of our "imaginative life": the question of fiction seems to be, in this perspective, a where-question raised by our strong intuition of a oundary between the real world and what does mentally and subjectively pop up and capture us into other multiple kinds of universes. On the contrary, I will defend that the best way to interpret a work of fiction is probably to firmly stay with our feet on the unique ground we apprehend since ever, most of the time by multiplying symbols – not locations.

Göran Rossholm (University of Stockholm)
RECEPTION, THOUGHT AND TALK ABOUT NARRATIVE FICTION.

The paper consists of one step back and one step ahead with respect to the concept of fiction (applied to narrative fiction). Back: Efforts of defining fiction (=fictional works, discourses, narratives) are usually made by references to textual features, authorial intentions, readers' uptake and combinations. However, they never result in any convincing agreement with intuitions about what is fictional and is not. Therefore, I suggest we should restrict ourselves to try to determine the characteristics of fictional reception. Ahead: Influential theories of reader reception (for

instance, Kendall Walton's *Mimesis as Make-Believe*) often use the term "imagination" to point to the core of the experience of reading fiction. The present paper will propose a more specific approach by using the term "information". This proposal is evidenced by how we talk and think about fiction, and also how we retell fictional stories.

Ondřej Sládek (Czech Academy of Sciences)
TWO TYPES OF WORLDS: FICTIONAL WORLDS AND RELIGIOUS WORLDS

In this paper I will outline the basic correspondences and differences between the concepts of fictional and religious worlds. A fictional world is a macrostructure consisting of entities (characters, objects and places) and relations between them. At the same time, it is subject to certain restrictions that shape in a crucial way: (a) fictional worlds are accessible only through semiotic channels (reinstated and recoverable in the act of reading); (b) fictional worlds and their individual components have the status of unused possibilities; (c) fictional worlds are "small worlds" etc. A religious world is also a macrostructure consisting of entities (characters, objects and places) and relations between them. While fictional worlds are characterized as worlds that may be regarded as a frame of references for all entities constructed by a given fictional texts, religious worlds are worlds that exists not only by virtue of the semantic energy of the texts. Despite this, semiotic character of religious worlds is very important. In this paper I will focus mainly: 1. on general characteristics of fictional worlds and religious worlds; 2. on problem of accessibility relation; 3. on relationships between fictional texts and religious (sacred) texts.

Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping University)
THE NO-NAME THEORY OF FICTIONAL NAMES

Consider a story-world, for example the fictional world of the Sherlock Holmes stories. It has often been noted that the story-world differs from our ordinary notion of a possible world (from philosophical logic) in at least two ways: it is incomplete, and it may be inconsistent (Walton 1990:54; Predelli 2017:133–137). These differences can turn out to be relevant for how we should understand fictional names – if possible worlds are different from story-worlds, we might expect fictional names to work differently from ordinary proper names.

Fictional names work in ways that are different from the ways in which names for ordinary objects work. The question is how different they are. Do they name a special kind of objects, fictional objects? Do they mock-refer? Is the use of fictional names an exercise in pretending? Variations of these views have been tried, from Meinong onwards. One potentially important difference, compared with ordinary names, is that the introducer of fictional names doesn't even seem to try to refer to anything. The story-teller is not picking out one object, trying to get the reader to have *that* object in mind.

If we think that this attempt to single out one thing is what sets names apart from other expressions, fictional names seem to be ill suited to be accepted as real names. Even if someone fully understands a story, there is an open issue concerning *which* fictional object that is being picked out (assuming that there even are such things as fictional objects).

One contender is the *no-name view*, so-called by Predelli (2017). This view has some likeness with Frege's conception of fictional names as "mock-names" (Frege 1897; for opposition to such a reading of Frege, see Bell 1990).

According to this view, fictional names may well be names in a grammatical sense, but not in any interesting semantic sense. Fictional names are no more names than fictional coins are "a peculiar type of change at my disposal" (Predelli, p. 126).

Some ideas from Predelli (2017) will be used to account for the special character of fictional names. Predelli is perhaps the clearest and most consistent presentation of a no-name view, and his treatment is also commendably straightforward about outstanding problems. Predelli leaves some issues as problems to be dealt with on a later occasion.

I will say something about some of the problems mentioned by Predelli, and concentrate on an issue concerning what role an account of the semantics of fictional names is supposed to play. The no-name theory entails that there is no semantics of fictional names, and that the contribution made by fictional statements is not to be provided a semantic interpretation, or, rather, that providing some "trouble-free fictional semantics" won't help us address the problems about fictional names (Predelli, p. 128).

So in at least some sense, there is no semantic problem for fictional names. But this leaves many issues undecided. A natural idea is that we appeal to semantics as a part of the explanation of successful communication and understanding, and if we for fiction are to be left without much of a semantics, we should perhaps look elsewhere for explanation of the nature of communication with fiction.

Here there are several options, and in my talk I will outline them, giving the no-name theory a helping hand. The pre-semantic background, which Predelli develops in earlier chapters, will be central here.

Bell, D. (1990): "How 'Russellian' was Frege?", *Mind* 99, pp. 267–277.
Frege, G. (1897): "Logic", in H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach (eds.), *Frege. Posthumous Writings*, Blackwell, Oxford, 126–151.
Predelli, S. (2017): *Proper Names: A Millian Account*, Oxford UP, Oxford.
Walton, K. (1990): *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass.

Enrico Terrone (Logos, Universitat de Barcelona)
THE END OF THE FICTIONAL WORLD. CAUSALITY AND TELEOLOGY IN NARRATIVES

The notions of a fictional world can be figured out in three ways. In logical terms, a fictional world is a maximally comprehensive state of affairs (cf. Wolterstorff). In ontological terms, a fictional world is a concrete spatiotemporal system (cf. Lewis). In phenomenological terms, a fictional world is an imagined spatiotemporal framework that enables our narrative experiences and allows us to share them (cf. Strawson). I shall argue that the notion of a fictional world that is relevant for the arts is the phenomenological one, thereby contending that philosophical problems about fictions often arise because philosophers replace this notion with the logical one or with the ontological one. Relying on this phenomenological notion, I shall highlight a crucial difference between the fictional world and the actual world. While the latter is governed by causality, the former is governed by teleology. That is to say that an event in the actual world is just the effect of a cause, whereas an event in the fictional world is also a means to an end. Finally, I shall consider the sharply different ways in which film narratives and television narratives construct teleological fictional worlds in spite of sharing the same audiovisual medium.

Lee Walters (University of Southampton)
FICTION OPERATORS, EXPLICITISM, AND SERIAL FICTIONS

I consider and reject an argument for explicitism from William D'Alessandro. I then distinguish a number of different fiction operators (e.g. 'in F', 'according to F', 'in the world of F') and elucidate the differences between them before defending a limited form of explicitism about 'according to F'.

Zsófia Zvolenszky (ELTE, Budapest)
LIMITS ON AUTHORS' AUTHORITY OVER FICTIONAL WORLDS

In previous work I made a case for one way in which authors have limited authority over the fictional worlds they create. I argued that occasionally, the inhabitants of those worlds are inadvertently created by authors. The reason: if authors erroneously believe that there is, in reality, a person/city they intend to feature in their work, then they inadvertently create a fictional object as an inhabitant of the world they are describing. In my presentation, I will explore how those arguments having to do with authors' error relate to limitations from another source on authors' authority over the fictional objects they create: limitations that emerge in the context of various intentionalist views about the interpretation of works of fiction.