Thursday 15. 10. 2026 14:00
lecture | Meeting room 124a, Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
Jeremiah Joven Joaquin: Impossible Obligations
Organized by the Department of Logic
Detailed information
Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (Department of Philosophy, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines)
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8621-6413
Impossible Obligations
Abstract
An axiom of standard deontic logic is the D axiom. It tells us that if an action is obligatory, then it is permitted. One theorem that immediately results from this axiom is the “Consistency of Obligations” theorem. It tells us that if an action is impossible (or self-contradictory), then one can’t obligate someone to do it. In this paper, I present two counterexamples to this theorem (thus showing that impossible obligations are at least “possible”). I then explore some existing deontic systems that may account for this type of obligation and show their strengths and weaknesses.
