Roque Molina: Multiple realizability and the neuronal type. The quest for some kind of brain state identity theory.

Organized by the Department of Analytic Philosophy

Roque Molina: Multiple realizability and the neuronal type. The quest for some kind of brain state identity theory.

Abstract
In this talk I want to introduce multiple realizability as a theoretical and empirical guide for an analysis of what counts as/should count as a type in terms of mind-brain identities. In this respect, the multiple realization of mental states by different brain states sheds light on the theoretical and methodological limitations as well as possibilities behind a mind-brain identity thesis. From a more general perspective, I want to open up a discussion about non-reductive physicalism as a materialist theory and its commitments to non-reducibility. I intend to keep the talk accessible for anyone interested in the question regarding the nature and character of the mind-brain relationship.